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BATTLE OF LITERARY CRITTCISM, CULTURAL
CRITICISM, CLOSE READING, AND STYLISTICS




Keahlian apaAang lebih bermanfaat dalammemahamf karyasosfro ? Apakah
keahlian membaca cermat, kritik sestre, kritik budaya, ctcu sfi/ishka? Tulisan
ini bertujuan untuk menyaring pendapat Aang mendukung masing-masing
keahlian tersebut di atas. Selain itu, akan diuraikan pula pendapat saya
sendiri bahtua dengan semakin luasnya bidang kajian sestra, Aong saat ini
sudah memasukkan bidang-bidang ilmu lain, ada baiknya memfokuskan pada
rnembaca cermat don sfi/rstika. Tulisan ini dibatasi pada pertorangan antar
bidang kajian dalam lingkup pengajaran sosfrc Renoiscns.
r{c,takunci : kanon, strakturalis, sejarauan Baru, Kritik Baru,negasi
det erminasi, formalisme.
Abstract
Which ski/l fs more usefuI in understanding a literary tuork: close reading,
Iiterary criticism, cultural critique, or stylistics? This essaA attempts tofi.Iter the
'\ argutnents of supporters of each of those skii/s, uhile inserting here and there
mA oun opinion that tuith the euer broadening scope of literary studies, tuhich
has notu included so manA other disciplines, it is a good idea to focus on close
reading and stylisttcs. Since the discourse is of such infnite magnitude, I haue
Iimited this essay only to the battle of uarious disciplines tuithin the scope of
te aching Rena isson ce liter atur e.
Keg Word.s: canon, sfrucfura/ists, New Hisforicrsts, Netu Criticism,
det er minat e ne g ation, fo r malism.
1. lntroduction: Opening up to Larger lntellectual and Cultural Arenas?
"There are many tasks that confront criticism, many things we need to
advance our understanding of literature, but one thing we do not need is more
interpretations of literary works." That ever echoing sentence from "Beyond
lnterpret-ation," the 1976 essay that opens Jonathan Cutler's book The Pursuit
of Signs, has served for more than a decade as a motto for those who want to
reform Engtish and Literary studies. Attacking the setf-contained interpretations
of New Criticism in the name of theory, the structuraUsts and their successors




were struggting to open our profession to targer intettectuat'and cutturat arenas.
We did not need to keep on merety practicing what we a[ready knew how to do,
adding instances and refining toots. Rather, we needed to stand back and think
' about what we had tearned to do, so as to make it more broadty avaitabte for
our students and more usefuI to society. Cutter's own program inctuded, among
other things, studies of the history of titerature as an institution, of "the rote
of literature in the psychotogical economies of both writers and readers," of
"the historicat, the psychic, [and] the social retationships . . . between the real
and the fictive," which is to say, "the ways of moving between tife and art" (6).
Projects such as these were to promote "the reinvdntion of literary history"
(13). fhe Pursuit of Signs ctosed with a ringing ca[[ for interdisciptinarity in a
1979 piece called "Literary Theory in the Graduate Program," and the thrust of
the whote effort was to stake out greater ctaims for whatever it is that we did
or might do as students of literature.
2. The Classroom as lnterdisciplinary Battleground
Cutler's vision has by now been targety imptemented. Literature as an institution,
the psychodynamics of writers and readers, the fictive constiuction of the real
and the real construction of the fictive, the sociotogical interpenetration of
art and [ife, and even the renovation of literary history-atong with further
dimensions and fietds of study that Cutter did not then yet envision-have
joined the stock-in-trade of both schotarship and graduate studies. And yet
the discontent remains. Even though wq are now doing everything we were
totd twenty years ago we ought to be doing, the same comptaints can stitt be
heard, as evidenced by the session "Do We Stitt Do Literary Criticism? Shoutd
Our Students?," which was one of the tittes of the NCTE's "Literate Lives: A
Human Right" Conference (Juty 2007), which stimulated me to write this essay.
One thing we stitl do not need, some appear to feel at the conference, is more
literary criticism. We stitt need theory cutturat studies, interdisciptinarity,
freed from the constraints of continuing to do what we have atready done.
ln echoing Cutter, however; we are not simply repeating the past, for
his stogan acquires a sense he coutd not have foreseen at the time. When he
wrote, interpretation stitt stood opposed to theory. But with the passing of
time interpretation has grown out of its narVet6 and has tong become part
of theory. Consequentty, Cutter's probtem in the tate '70s is no tonger quite
our probtem. The question we now ask is not whether we shoutd turn from
literary interpretation to literary theory, but whether we shoutd transform
Iiterary criticism into something like culturol critique. Even if we advance the
same proposition as Cutter, in other words, we are catting a different term into
question. The debates of the'70s and earty'80s about method-interpretation
vs. theory-have modutated into debates about fietd-titerature vs. cutture.
Vol.34No. 1 - Januari 2O1O
OaLtle of Literary Criticism
We shoutdn't do literary criticism, one argument runs, because
literature is an outmoded designation. lnstead we shoutd open up the canon
and free oursetves from the biases of setection imptied by the term literature.
Yet opening up the canon shoutd property be seen as an embracing gesture
rather than a demystifying one; by opening up the canon you are not abotishing
literature but rendering ever more things titerary. Atmost any text can become
literary when read criticatty: just look at Subur Wardoyo's reading of Brendan
Gitt's psychobiographicat text Here at the New Yorker ("Literary Criticism in
Theory and Practice," 41-58). Cutler and many others long ago abandoned the
category of the literary as a substantive, exctusivist entity. (Stantey Fish, "Anti-
Professionatism" 235-36, puts the case wetl.) But that doesn't free us from
either the obtigations or the pteasures of literary criticism, an activity that
continues and shoutd continue, over ever-broadening domains.
"Do we stitt do literary criticism? Shoutd our students?" My answers to
these questions are the fottowing: many of us-teachers and students atike-do
literary criticism, and more of us shoutd. Doing literary criticism, I shatt be
suggesting, is how we hear other voices as we read, instead of projections
of oursetves. Kant's famous aphorism about intuitions and concepts comes in
handy here: while criticism without critique (critical anatysis) is empty, critique
without criticism is btind. Doing titerary criticism does not mean studying a
particular body of texts, but studying texts in a particular way. My main purpose
is to take up the study of style as the vehicte of literary criticism, which is to
say, of criticism generatly.
lndeed, if you say no, we shoutdn't do literary criticism, we should do
some other kind of criticism instead, then you stitl need to ctarify what it is
you are doing when you do that other kind of criticism, or that other kind of
intettectuat activity, and how it differs from the titerary criticism we used to do
as wetl as from the activities of schotars in other disciptines into which we might
otherwise get absorbed. Before we ask whether we do or shoutd do titerary
criticism, those of us who were brought up doing it need first to ask a question
that sounds atmost sitly, but, as I shatl suggest, isn't at att-namety, how can we
do anything other than titerary criticism?
Jonathan Arac has recentty described literature (he specifies fiction,
but I think unnecessarity) as writing "that does not fit any defined marketing
genre" (26). lf we take this way of thinking seriousty enough, we can infer
from it a notion of literature as the other whose content is not predictabte
from any experience timited to oursetves or to the immediate circumstances
of our present cutture. lt fatts outside norms and thus catts them into question.
Literature and criticism then turn out to be interdependent terms: works of
any sort function as literature when they are used criticatty. But if literature
is inherentty critical because its nature is to exptode categories, then our
questions become atmost pointtess: criticism constitutes literature; there is no
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criticism that is not literary criticism. This view rests on a long and potiticatty
diverse tradition, explicitty associated with names as various as Arnotd and
Adorno, Mattarme and Witde, and imptied by many others, inctuding Benjamin
and Bakhtjn. And the same tradition, it seems to me, has inspired much of the
recovery of marginatized expressions, to the extent that they are vatued for
their resistance to dominant norms.
The thesis that literature is critical by nature is famitiar, as are many
arguments for and against it. I am not going to enter the battte directty. My
purpose here is to sketch a supporting indirect argument. l't[ ask what the
consequences are of notdoing titerary criticism. The peopte I want to describe as
having stopped are many of the Renaissance New Historicists. They are perhaps
not the ones I might be expected to point out, since they continue to write
about literature-whatever that is- and to use many of the traditionat toots
of our trade. But many prominent recent studies of Renaissance cutture share
two characteristics that make a surprising pairing, leading me into the heart of
my message. For purposes of debate, I witl charge these two characteristics of
much Renaissance New Historicism with being uncriticat and hence unliterary.
The first characteristic has been widety observed, most finety perhaps
by Atan Liu. 'lt is the mirror- tike quatity of many New Historicist studies.
The Renaissance that they describe mirrors the contemporary wortd the
New Historicist critics see around them. Notorious is the opening of Stephen
Greenbtatt's Shdkespearian Negotiations: "l began with the desire to speak
with the dead" (1), which is reiterated in the conctusion of the same essay: "if
I wanted to hear the voice of the other, I had to hear my own voice" (20). White
Greenbtatt's meaning is more complicated than my report makes it sound, the
superficial appearance remains retevant: this schoot, in its obsession with power,
authority, disptay, containment, and subversion, discovers what it atready
knew about. The increasing disptacement of the designation "Renaissance" by
"earty modern" (which has been criticized by Leah Marcus and more sharpty
by Heather Dubrow) is a symptom of the risk that voyages of setf discovery
witt cottapse difference, as if eartier ages were.merety more primitive, tess
devetoped, or etse purer versions of our own era. We practice titerary criticism,
I shatt suggest, not when we speak with the dead, but when we recognize voices
interpettating us-titerqry history as provocation, to adapt Wardoyo's formuta
of mutipte concsiouness and the observer- narrator (The Observer-Norrotor os
Themotic ond structurol Device in wittiam Fautkner, 1'26).
A second characteristic seems not to have been noticed pubticty. lt is
that Renajssance New Historicists do not discuss and certainty do not theorize
styte. Appearances of the word "styte" are rare and sometimes deformed. ln a
quick check, for instance, I noted the word "styte" onty once in Greenbtatt's
ShakespearionNegotiotions,in a footnote quotation from Pierre Bourdieu, and
tikewise onty once in Richard Hetgerson's Forms of Notionhood, in a quotation
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from the poet Samuel Daniet. White Jonathan Gotdberg's Jomes I and the
Politics of Literature has a section catted "The Styte of Gods" (28-54), "style"
there has its archaic meaning of designation-kings are styted gods-and onty
by erroneous usage does the modern meaning misteadingty get attributed to
"the Roman styte" (53). Richard Hatpern's Poetics of Primitive Accumulation, a
kind of critique of New Historicism from within, does have a chapter subtitted
"ldeology and Styte Production in Tudor Engtand" (19-60). But its conctusion
reveatingty makes styte "the sign that textual decoding had uttimatety been
unified . . . into a system of regular differences" (56); Hatpern, that is, equates
styte with structure, leaving no reatm for free ptay and change. "The ideotogical
force of writing," as he says in a tater chapter, "is the specific pressure that its
virtual regimes can exert . . . either to reinforce or to oppose the reproduction
of the social order" (8a). And by "oppose" the book ctearty understands outtawry
and destruction. There is no middte ground between tyrannical imposition and
violent revott. This is, finatty, not far from an idea buried in Greenbtatt's work:
in its onty supportive anatysis of styte, Renaissance Self-Fashioning anatyzes
what a summary catls Wyatt's "detiberate stytistic roughness" (160) as a sign
of mantiness, but then inconsistentty btames Wyatt for "aggression, bad faith,
setf-interest, and frustrated longing" (156).
Critiques tike these betray the fear of styte and of stylistics impticit
in many Renaissance New Historicat projects. Often the fear is coded as a
rejectionof "ctose reading." Hetgerson sees ctose reading as an "institutionat"
imperative rather than as a personal engagement (Forms of Nationhood 311
n. 55). In a recent PMLA roundtabte Stephen Orget has professed himsetf "not
much interested" in "close reading" ("Status" 29). Even more resolutely, the
Foucautdian music historian Gary Tomtinson has condemned "ctose reading" as
a "constraining notion" compticit with "the aestheticism and transcendentatism
of eartier ideotogies" ("Musical Pasts" 21-22). But like the best of his feltow
archaeologists-of knowtedge, Tomtinson in fact does not engage in a new kind
of reading; rather, he merety disptaces his ctose reading from the (musicat)
texts provided by his home disciptine to "other voices that have seemed too
distant to hear" (Music 43). Setf-evidentty, when Tomtinson proposes a "new
reading of the same passages" of Ficino as a previous critic and when he ctaims
that "we witt need to read again the specific passages from his writings that
Watker's interpretation misconstrued" (Music 101, 105), he is aiming at better
ctose reading, and by no means rejecting the enterprise attogether. Whatever
his precepts, his practice proves congruent with the conctusion of Douglas
Mao's articutate defense of New Criticism, namety, "that reading things is our
business"
(252). (For another recent defense of New Criticism see Geoffrey
Hartman, "The Fate of Reading Once More.") Among those who profess to
reject stytistics and ctose reading, however, Greenbtatt is again the most
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revealing. His essay "The Circulation of Social Energy" (in Shakespearian
Negotiotions) begins by conceding that "close reading" of what he catts "formal
and linguistic design" belongs in the classroom, but he has atready stacked the
cards by designating formatism and stytistics as design rather than energy or
invention, and he immediately disclaims any interest in studying them. lndeed,
there is a distinctty hostile note in this opening gesture. "The textua[ anatyses
I was trained to do had as their goal the identification and cetebration of a
divine literary authority, whether that authority was uttimatety located in the
mysterious genius of an artist or in the mysterious perfection of a text whose
intuitions and concepts can never be expressed in other terms" (3). lt cites
a sentence from Wittiam Wimsatt's essay on the concrete universal: "ln each
poem there is something (an individuat intuition-or a concept) which can never
be expressed in other terms" (165). Now of atl the New Critics, Wimsatt was the
great student of styte, and Greenbtatt's rejection of this teacher in particutar
has many imptications for the resources and mission of literary criticism.
Greenbtatt attributes to Wimsatt a betief in "mysterious perfection."
These are not Wimsatt's words; he prefers the concepts of "maturity or
sophistication or richness or depth" ("Concrete" 82). Wimsatt fotlows his
sentence about something inexpressibte in poems with this ctarification, which
conctudes the essay: "lt is tike the square root of two or like pi, which cannot
be expressed by rational numbers, but onty as their limit. Criticism of poetry is
tike 1 .414 .. . or 3.1416 . . ., not att it woutd be, yet att that can be had and
very usefut" (83). To the stytistician, poetry is precise, irrationat, and powerful,
but neither mysterious nor perfect. (The casual misstatement of the value of pi,
'which shoutd be 3.1415 .. , iS very much in the spirit of Wimsatt's humitity.)
Greenbtatt misrecognizes Wimsatt's "individual intuition" as a mysticat flight,
when Wimsatt ctearty intended a different sense of "intuition," Kantian
Anschauung. Poetry continuousty presses- us to revise our approximations;
it affords us better, more exact, more rigorous concepts than any that our
imperfect language attots us. lt does not magicatty inspire us but tests us.I betieve that the two characteristics of many Renaissance New
Historicists are retated. First, they are not criticat: they see themsetves, their
own concerns, their modernity in tooking into otd texts. Second, they do not
study styte. Syttogisticatty they see themsetves in the texts because they do not
study styte. For styte is the irreducible otherness of irrationa[ precision that does
not fatl into the generat categories to which uncritical reading reduces texts. As
Stantey Fish has written, in the wake of a critique of the fashion for mechanistic
categorization that briefly passed for stytistics, genuine stytistic features are
"tocal and temporary." Dependent on a "finite but infinitety flexibte abitity"
and recognized through "a personal knowtedge of what it means to have it," the
study of styte "can have no rutes in the sense of discovery procedures" ("What
ls Stytistics" 95). And, as Marjorie Sabin has forcefutty argued, styte, criticatty.
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disptayed, is literature's chattenge to the timetess universals hiding the act'ion of
cuttural expressions. Renaissance New Historicism, it is often alteged, lacks an
adequate conception of subjectivity or of personal agency. (See, for instance,
Kerrigan; Mikics 3-14; and, most recentty, Strier 67-79. A simitar critique coutd
be made of Steven Maittoux's pragmatist American historicism; "rhetoric," in
his usage, probtematizes ideotogies and discursive formations, but vitiates the
critical force of "styte" by relegating meaning to institutional forces of the
past and present.) Through their styte, cuttural expressions become [iterary
by resisting the ideatizing universats into which our ideotogies otherwise stide.
That is the way literature octs criticatty in expressing its difference fqom att
imposed thoughts. /
That is my conctusion but not my end. I append a pair of etucidations,
in the second of which I attempt to say a few more, necessarity brief words
about what styte means in this context.
3. Conclusion
First etucidation. I have been carefuI to timit my negative exampiu, furg"ty
to Renaissance New Historicists. I by no means intend to impeach historicists
generatty. Many noted Romantic historicists, for instance, have subtte ears for
style which they use to make revealing critical distinctions between epochs and
among authors and within texts: I coutd instance Jerome McGann and David
Simpson, Marjorie Levinson and Marityn Butler; and many more. And so tikewise
our great latter-day Adorno, Fredric Jameson.
Second and finaI etucidation. I want to propose a definition of styte.
According to Wimsatt and Fish atike, the study of styte is the study of the
minute precisions that correct any and atI generatizations. A writer's styte is
the way he,-or she continues to differ from anything you have yet said about
her or him. lts resistance to our critical mastery (tike Wimsatt's pi) forces ever-
increasing precision. At once impatpable and exact, styte is a cardinal instance
of what Hege[ catts determinate negation. ln contrast to general negation-the
raw conflicts of subject and object or master and servant anatyzed in a famous,
earty section of the Phenomenology of Spirit-a later anatysis of "the matter
itsetf " (die Sache selbst) hightights the quatitative negativity ("Negation ats
Quatitdt," Phiinomenologie 289) that atlows reason to flower into spirit. Even
without a detaited account of what Hegel specificatty means by such determinate
negation (for which see Brown's "Why Styte Matters" 85-86), the term itsetf
usefutty suggests what is at stake in a return to stytistics. For in their specutarity
and their negtect of the critical, stytistic dimension, the Renaissance New
Historicists I have instanced lack a vitaI means of determining specificatjon. ln its
absence, they fatt into what Catherine Gattagher cteverty catts "indeterminant
negativity" (41\; that is why their categories so characteristicatty turn
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oppositional and globat, as with Hatpern's Hobson's choice between reinforcing
or tearing down the sociat order. Critique then keeps stipping into crisis, as
Reinhart Kosetteck iltustrated in his beautiful study of the ideotogicat origins of
the French Revolution. We retain the criticat edge when we refine, modify, and
correct instead of resisting, and we do that when we study in literary criticat,
and diacriticat fashion.
l't[ ctose by mentioning Fredric Jameson, whom I have atready invoked
as a genuinety critical reader (which doesn't mean that I always agree with
him). Jameson proposes the concept of determinate negation in the chapter
concerned with styte in his book on Wyndham Lewis. (The chapter is catted,
"Hairy Surgicat, and lnvisibte," which isn't a bad paraphrase for the actions
of criticat thought.) And in lAarxism and Form Jameson writes as fottows, "To
define styte as tanguage which detiberatety catts attention to itsetf . . . is to
reassert the profoundty historical nature of the phenomenon" (335). The word
to stress there is "profoundty." The return to styte is a return to language in its
function as the determinade negation constituting history from deep within as
a continuously modutating process. Without literature, which is to say, without
literary criticism, our tools are crude, our concepts inexact, and our history one
of uncomprehending cottisions. We have a[[ read histories like that, and titerary
criticism is what we need in order to strive toward better ones.
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